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## BULLETIN

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BULLETIN OF THE FACULTY OF ARTS

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# THE FALL OF THE MAMLUKS<sup>(1)</sup>

1516 – 1517

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The passing of the Mamluk empire, and the incorporation of Egypt into the empire of the Turk, did not actually take place until April 1517. There was nothing in the beginning of the fifteenth century, or in the middle of it, that could have conceivably pointed to that possibility. Little indeed did the Mamluks dream that the Ottomans, after having stretched over the Balkans and the petty states of Asia Minor, would then endeavour to reach out to their venerable Sultanate. The irony of the matter is that the Mamluk sultans, to 1461, often hailed Turkish triumphs as if they were their own, and the contemporary chroniclers of Egypt seldom failed to extol the qualities of a passing Ottoman Sultan, or to commemorate his fighting feats in their usual flowery style. At every new accession, too, whether in Cairo or Brusa, congratulations and compliments were freely exchanged; and when Constantinople fell into the hands of the Ottomans, its capture was the cause of great rejoicings and celebrations in the Mamluk Capital. But from 1461 onward, the old mutual amity and goodwill between the Mamluks and the Turks were being gradually turned to enmity, and jealousy. Actual war between the two countries did not, however, take place until 1483, and it lasted for eight years; but the interval of good relations which supervened between the conclusion of peace in 1491 and the year 1515 proved to be only a lull before the cataclysm which swept the Mamluks and their empire from the face of the earth. The first rumblings of the storm became unmistakable when news reached Cairo, in the closing months of 1515, that Sultan Salim the Grim had been for some time busy with the construction of a new fleet and arsenal. Thereupon Sultan Kansuh al-Ghuri turned Cairo into a busy hive for war preparations, and the imminent encounter with the Ottomans became the sole talk of the day. And for close on two



years, all Mamluk effort was spent in grappling with the Ottoman danger, to the point of exhaustion, and against formidable odds, until the last Mamluk Sultan Tumanbey II was no more.

Thus during the reign of Sultan Barsbey (1422—1438), Turco-Mamluk relations were of the most amicable kind, thanks to the arrogance of the Ilkhan Shah Rukh of Persia, who was enemy of the Mamluks, to the Ottoman Sultan Murad II and his father Muhammad I before him<sup>(2)</sup>. Turkish envoys came to Cairo in 1423, with the congratulations of Murad II on Barsbey's auspicious elevation to the Sutanate, in the preceding year. Barsbey was highly gratified, especially as the gifts which the envoys brought to his presence were so rich and magnificent<sup>(3)</sup>. Murad sent another gorgeous present to Cairo in 1426, consisting of nine white slaves and a number of silk cloths, as well as several furs of sable and ermine. His messengers had much to tell on their return to Hadrianople, for during their stay in Egypt, the third Mamluk expedition to Cyprus returned to Cairo with victory, and King Janus of Lusignan, bareheaded and in chains, was led to the Sultan's presence at the Citadel, whither the Ottoman had been especially invited to bear witness to Mamluk prowess and power<sup>(4)</sup>. It was probably due to Murad's consequent jealousy of Barsbey's stroke of fortune, that as many as fifty Christian prisoners of war were sent by him to Cairo in 1428, after the successful Turkish campaign against some principality in Asia Minor, whose people Aini the chronicler called al-Ankiroz<sup>(5)</sup>. In 1433 two young fugitive nephews of Murad II, a boy named Sulayman and a girl named Shahzadah, were brought from Aleppo to Cairo in Barsbey's train, on his return from his futile campaign against Amid. Barsbey let them reside at the Citadel, settled upon them a comfortable annuity, and put no stint upon their freedom. Murad II left the youngsters to the care of his ally, who had been enraptured with the beauty and grace of the fair young damsel, and hoped to marry her as soon as she blossomed into maturity. In 1436, however, the two children were kidnapped by some Turkoman enemies of Murad II; but the whole party was soon captured and brought back to Cairo, where the kidnappers were summarily punished. Sulayman was appointed Gentleman-in-Attendance to Barsbey's son Yusuf, and was thus kept under constant surveillance; but the little princess was married to the



Sultan, and introduced to the harem. On hearing the news Murad was greatly relieved, and he sent a great present to Cairo, as a token of gratitude to his unfailing friend<sup>(6)</sup>,

Djakmak's accession to the Sultanate, in 1438, only seemed to enhance Ottoman amity towards the Mamluk empire, for apart from Djakmak's conciliatory tone towards his coreligionists, he had impressed and awed the voluptuous but mystic Murad II by his extreme piety and austerity. Murad's congratulatory message to the new Sultan in 1439 was full of reverential greetings, and his present to him exceeded any of those that had been sent to Cairo in the reign of Barsbey<sup>(7)</sup>. It was presumably little after the departure of that embassy, that Djakmak married the widowed Shahzadah, and henceforward Murad's despatches to him were always prefaced with epithets of filial esteem<sup>(8)</sup>. Repeated embassies with rich presents were exchanged between the two courts for the rest of Djakmak's reign, and when in 1444 Murad defeated the joint forces of Vladislav king of Hungary and Hunyadi the Voivode of Transylvania at Varna, several Christian captives were sent to Cairo as a sample of the trophies of the great battle<sup>(9)</sup>. Murad, who in 1444 had once abdicated in favour of his son Muhammad II, now retired and fixed his residence at Magnesia. In 1445, however, the Janissaries became discontented; Murad was accordingly compelled to reascend the throne, and to spend the remaining six years of his life in warfare in Europe<sup>(10)</sup>.

Djakmak was equally held in great esteem by Sultan Muhammad II, who had signalised his first installation to the Ottoman throne in 1444 by a magnificent present to the Mamluk Court<sup>(11)</sup>. So when Muhammad finally became Sultan in 1451, Djakmak hastened to respond to his early courtesy by sending a special congratulatory embassy to Hadrianople<sup>(12)</sup>. Two years later Djakmak died, and in March 1453 Inal came to the Mamluk throne. In that very month Muhammad II had completed all his preparations for the impending siege of Constantinople, so that it was not till after the fall of the venerable Capital into his hands in the following May, that he was able to send a congratulatory mission to Cairo. Inal received the Turkish envoys in audience, and evinced the liveliest joy on hearing of the conquest of Constantinople. For several days Cairo celebrated

the victory with grand festivities, during which the Sultan's band played every morning at the Citadel<sup>(13)</sup>. A more imposing embassy reached Cairo in 1456, with the news of recent Turkish victories over the Serbians at Novobrdó and elsewhere. Muhammad's bombastic despatch was written in rhymed prose, decked here and there with appropriate Koran verse, as well as extracts of encomiastic Arabic poetry<sup>(14)</sup>. The answer of Sultan Ināl was a fulsome replica of the conqueror's hyperbole; but before the emir Kanibey, who was entrusted with conveying it to the Ottoman Court, departed from Cairo, news arrived of the decease of Muhammad II. The dismal tidings proved false, much to the relief of Ināl, who ordered the royal band to play at the Citadel for three days, in proof of the country's joy. Eventually Kanibey went on his mission, from which he returned in 1457 with praise and presents<sup>(15)</sup>.

With the accession of the Greek Khushkadam to the sultanate, in 1461, a chapter of friction and rivalry between Turk and Mamluk was about to begin, owing to the continued expansion of the Ottomans at the expense of the little kingdoms of Asia Minor, of which the Karaman and the Turkomans of the Dhu-l-Kadr were looked upon by the Mamluks as their own vassals. The estrangement assumed definite shape in 1465, when the two sultans Khushkadam and Muhammad II took opposite sides on the succession questions of the Karaman and the Dhu-l-Kadr<sup>(16)</sup>; but the Arabic chroniclers could supply no information as to the origin of that estrangement, which developed in the later years of Khushkadam's reign into a latent enmity between the two Sultans. It appears, however, that in 1463 an Ottoman envoy bringing a despatch from Muhammad II couched in language to which Khushkadam took exception, added to the Sultan's injury by refusing to kiss the ground as he approached the royal presence, alleging that having just prostrated himself in prayer, it would be an affront to the Almighty to repeat the act of genuflection. On a subsequent occasion, the envoy conformed to the usage, and Khushkadam was much pleased, and offered him presents for the Sublime Porte; but these the envoy declined, alleging that dignity of his august master demanded a special embassy for their delivery<sup>(17)</sup>. Muhammad II infuriated the Sultan further by

giving a friendly welcome at his Court to several Egyptian administrators, who had gone into voluntary exile to evade the money exactions of their avaricious sovereign<sup>(18)</sup>. Small wonder, therefore, that Khushkadam spent the best part of his ruling years in opposing Turkish machinations in Asia Minor.

Sultan Kāitbey, who succeeded Khushkadam in 1467, was no less antagonistic than his predecessor as regards Ottoman intervention in the affairs of the Karaman and the Dhu-l-Kadr. About 1469, however, Kaitbey and Muhammad II arrived at an understanding, by which the former agreed to discontinue the assistance he had been giving to Ahmed of Karaman in his war against the Ottomans, and the latter undertook to cease from helping Shah Sawar who had by that time inflicted two serious defeats on the Egyptians. Thus reconciled, the Mamluk and Ottoman Sultans remained on the best of terms for many years to come<sup>(19)</sup>. Muhammad II began to send emissaries to Cairo to convey the news of his marvellous victories in Europe, as he had done in the days of Ināl. In 1470, an envoy of his reached Cairo to announce the news of the annexation of many of the islands in the Greek Archipelago belonging to Venice, and of the ravaging of the region of Friuli and other Venetian districts almost within sight of Venice itself<sup>(20)</sup>. Three years later, while the Egyptian forces under the emir Yashbak were marching to meet Uzun Hasan of Diyar Bakr in the field of battle, an Ottoman messenger came to the camp and offered the active assistance of his master. Muhammed II was in earnest, for Hasan was his deadly foe; but by the time another Ottoman messenger reached Cairo, in 1473, the news of Hasan's rout by the Egyptians was already reverberating throughout Syria and Egypt<sup>(21)</sup>. Kāitbey sent a special envoy to Muhammad II to thank him for his proffered aid, and within the eight years that remained of Muhammad's reign no fewer than four friendly embassies were exchanged between Cairo and Constantinople<sup>(22)</sup>.

Kaitbey was grieved at the death of Muhammad II, news of which came to Cairo in May 1481; but there was no reason to believe that the period of good relations that had endured for so long between the two countries was at an end with the



accession of Baydzid II, who succeeded his father in the Ottoman Sultanate. The new sultan, however, had a younger brother named Djem, who had intended from the first to dispute the throne. Djem was severely defeated by the forces of his brother, and escaped with great difficulty to Konia, where he had once been Governor, thence to Cairo which he reached with his mother, his harem and his daughter and son. Kaitbey went out of his way to invite a quarrel with the quiet and austere Bayazid II when he welcomed the exiled prince with peculiar honour, and supplied him with royal means to perform the pilgrimage<sup>(23)</sup>. On his return to Cairo, Djem entered into negotiations with his brother to obtain a share of the kingdom; but Bayazid would promise him only a suitable allowance. At the same time Djem's supporter and partisans in Asia Minor urged him to return to them and once more try the fortune of war, and in consequence of this Djem left Cairo at the end of March 1482, but took with him none of his family<sup>(24)</sup>. Kaitbey who let him go reluctantly, for he would have preferred to keep him at his Court, allowed him to assemble and equip adherents at Aleppo to invade Ottoman territory. This undertaking proved an utter failure, and as a result Djem disbanded his army and took ship to Rhodes, where he landed in July 1482 to become the guest of Grand Master d'Aubusson. Soon afterwards negotiations between the Grand Master and Bayazid II were begun, and an agreement was concluded by which the Sultan consented to pay 45,000 ducats annually to the Knights of St John, in return for which the latter undertook the maintenance and supervision of Djem. Subsequently d'Aubusson sent the hapless prince to France, to be interned in one of the houses of the Order there; Djem was thus landed at Villafranca in October 1482, and remained in France till the end of 1488<sup>(25)</sup>.

With Djem thus removed, Bayazid II began to give vent to his feelings towards Kaitbey who, apart from having given countenance to the pretender, had hindered the Ottoman Sultan from the pious work of repairing the water courses along the streets of Mecca, and had even connived at the plunder at Djedda of an Indian envoy bearing for the Sublime Porte a precious poniard with a diamond hilt, besides other presents of a similarly exquisite

taste<sup>(26)</sup>. Bayazid therefore sided with 'Ala-al-Dawla of the Dhu-l-Kadr, and early in 1483 aided him with considerable forces with which 'Ala harassed the Mamluk province of Malatiya. Again and again Bayazid supplied Ala with military support, and when the combined armies were defeated by the Egyptians in the middle of 1484, and the victors entered Aleppo with several Ottoman flags inverted, Bayazid II was only moved to further war endeavours to avenge himself upon Kaitbey. He therefore advised 'Ala-al-Dawla to continue the fight, and promised to supply him with ample amounts of men and munitions<sup>(27)</sup>.

From the very beginning of trouble with 'Ala-al-Dawla, the news of Bayazid's hostile attitude prompted Kaitbey, for obvious reasons, to set about conciliating the offended Ottoman. He took his emirs into his confidence, and it was agreed in council to send the veteran diplomat Djanibek Habib to Constantinople, with a very rich gift and a friendly message, and also the stolen Indian dagger with the diamond handle. Habib also carried with him a diploma of investiture from the Khalifa, and a letter of kindness and sweet words from the same exalted source; but Sultan Bayazid rejected all overtures, pointedly ill-received the sweet-tongued envoy, and hostilities ensued<sup>(28)</sup>. Without warning and even before the return of Habib to Cairo, the Ottoman forces fell upon the Syrian border and took Tarsus and Adana and other cities. The governor of Aleppo apprised the Sultan Kaitbey post-haste, and urged him to send the largest army he could assemble, advising him if possible to lead the armies in person. An expedition was therefore promptly despatched from Cairo, in September 1485, under the commandership of the emir Izbek, who threw himself into the battle as soon as he arrived on the scene. Fierce fighting followed with mixed success; but in the end, the Mamluks won the day in a bloody engagement near Adana, and carried off a multitude of captives who, with the heads of the slain, were brought in triumph into Cairo. The Turkish general, Hersek Ahmad Pasha, who was also captured, was brought to Cairo in chains with another batch of prisoners in the train of Izbek<sup>(29)</sup>,

The Ottoman rout served only to fire the austerity of Bayazid II into a paroxysm of determined rage. Vast preparations

for a greater campaign were immediately begun, and the news of the mobilization of a huge Turkish army reached Cairo a least four months before the return of Izbek. Kaitbey strained every nerve to equip an adequate expedition, and even intimated that he might lead the armies in person. But as his treasury was already depleted by the expenses of the last wars, and his Mamluks were making impossible demands, he resorted to the method of extorting the necessary funds by means of force. Thus he levied contributions to the amount of a two-months' rental from the real estates belonging to the Pious Foundations as well as private individuals; he also forced the superannuated members of the reservist corps (Awlad-al-Nas) to commute for their needed services at the front with a fixed sum of money, and he taxed Jews and Christians as well as leading Egyptian merchants correspondingly. While all these measures were being enforced, and the various war preparations completed, the news reached Cairo that the Ottoman troops were already hammering at the gates of Adana, and further news came to announce the surrender of the town of Ayas to the Turkish arms without the necessity of a battle. By that time, however, Kaitbey had completed all preparations, and the army marched from Cairo in the middle of May 1485, under the emir Izbek. It was the greatest army that had ever left Egypt, since the advent of the Circassians to the Mamluk throne in 1382<sup>(30)</sup>.

It appears, however, that in the midst of his feverish preparations to meet the Ottoman troops in battle, Kaitbey was not averse to the possibility of coming to terms of peace with Bayazid II. It was presumably for the realisation of that end that he unfettered the captive Hersek Ahmad Pasha, as well as many other Ottoman prisoners of war, and caused it to be noised abroad that he was about to send them back to Turkey<sup>(31)</sup>. This peace move, however, did not produce any result. About the same time, Kaitbey was endeavouring to get Prince Djem handed over to him by the King of France and the Knights of Rhodes, in order to be able to use him as a means of bringing pressure to bear on Bayazid II. But Kaitbey failed repeatedly in that endeavour, and the "envoy of the King of the Franks", who reached Cairo in June 1488, carried only a handsome present to the Sultan<sup>(32)</sup>.



During the same month, news came from Aleppo that after their capture of Adana and Ayas, the Ottomans were now approaching Bab al-Mulk (Iskandarum), the port of Aleppo, with a fleet of sixty ships, in an endeavour to land a considerable body of troops in the bay, with which to waylay the armies under Izbek. Fortunately for the Mamluk general, who was then within sight of the coast, a fierce storm blew and frustrated all attempts at landing. The few Ottomans who managed, however, to reach the shore, were slain at leisure by the Egyptians. Shortly afterwards Izbek continued the march northward, and besieged Adana where most of the Ottoman forces were concentrated. The siege went on for three months, after which the town surrendered, following its evacuation by the Ottomans. Izbek then returned to Cairo in February 1489, and brought with him a great number of captives who had deserted to him. They were willing to serve under the Sultan, and Kāitbey accepted them and settled them in a special barracks, which was subsequently called the Othmaniya<sup>(33)</sup>.

Far from being discouraged by the failure of the last two expeditions, Bayazid II was bent on prosecuting the war to the bitter end. And no sooner had the Mamluk army left Syria for Egypt, than a third Ottoman expedition began to march southwards, towards the Mamluk frontier. Kāitbey immediately despatched a small army to guard the province of Aleppo, until the arrival of a greater expedition to be sent promptly if necessity so ordained<sup>(34)</sup>. In view of the state of Kaitbey's treasury at that juncture, it is impossible to imagine that he was not anxious to make peace with Bayazid II. His soldiery had, on their return from Adana, demanded extensive largess as price for the last victory over the Ottomans, and in his hard endeavour to find money, with which to close their mouths, he confessed in council that his war expenses from 1467 to 1489 had amounted to 7,165,000 dinars; even the small army which he had just despatched had cost him 150,000 dinars<sup>(35)</sup>. Kaitbey must have been, therefore, inwardly pleased with the arrival, in May 1489, of an Ottoman peace intermediary, who was privately sent to him by Daoud Pasha, Vizier of Bayazid II. The envoy advised the Sultan to send a peace mission to Constantinople, but, considering

that Kaitbey was the victor so far, it was with justice that he informed the Ottoman that he would never make overtures for peace until Bayazid II had surrendered the keys of all fortress towns the Ottomans had captured<sup>(36)</sup>. And, to strengthen his case further, Kaitbey made yet another attempt to regain the person of Prince Djem, who had been just recently handed over by Charles VIII, King of France, and Grand Master d'Aubusson, to Pope Innocent VIII. Again Kaitbey failed, although he would have conceded much to the Pope, even (it is said) to the extent of relinquishing Jerusalem<sup>(37)</sup>.

It is not known whether Bayazid II was immediately informed by his Vizier Daoud Pasha of Kaitbey's first conditions of making peace; but it is certain that the Ottoman armies were mustering near Caesarea, during the closing months of 1489. 'Ala-al-Dawla of the Dhu-l-Kadr kept the Sultan Kaitbey informed of their movements, and in January 1490 his messenger came to Cairo with the news that the Ottoman troops had actually reached the northern Mamluk frontier<sup>(38)</sup>. Within a few weeks of that time, Kaitbey was able to despatch a very large expedition under the emir Izbek, who was empowered by the Sultan first to make soundings for peace. Kaitbey was, however, under no illusion as to the dogged determination of Bayazid II to prosecute his third campaign. He recruited a reserve army in Cairo, at the head of which he declared he would march to Syria in person at the first call for reinforcements. Before covering the last stage of the march to the border, however, the emir Izbek sent a Mamluk herald of the bodyguard corps, named Mamay, to the Ottoman camp as a messenger of peace. But Mamay was arrested and imprisoned by the Ottomans, and Izbek, tired of waiting, marched towards Caesarea in Asia minor, where he inflicted a decisive defeat on the Turks and captured several generals of their army. Caesarea itself was plundered and burned down, and several Ottoman towns in the district were served with the same fate. Then the Mamluk army marched in two divisions and advanced a little northward, but no important engagement took place as the Ottoman troops had retreated far into the heart of their country. Izbek made his third victorious entry into Cairo in November 1490<sup>(39)</sup>.

However, Kaitbey was far from being satisfied, for, recognising

the enormous resources of the Ottomans, he was in much alarm lest Bayazid should still seek for his revenge. He thus summoned a special council in January 1491, and laid the situation before them as plainly as he could: "The son of Othman," he said, "will never desist from waging war on the armies of Egypt until he had has his full measure of revenge." He proposed to make preparations, and to put all available troops in readiness for war. For that purpose he asked the Kadiss present to pronounce in favour of the legality of a contribution of one year's rental from all kinds of real property in Cairo, not excluding the Pious Foundations, and it was finally agreed in council to levy a five-months' rental. Several other financial measures were enforced in both Egypt and Syria to provide the sinews of the next war, which men began to believe was not far off, and everybody now thought that the oft-recurring rumour of the Sultan's march in person would this time come true<sup>(40)</sup>. But amidst the talk of impending war the improbable happened; in April 1491 Mamay, who had been sent by the emir Izbek as a peace envoy to the Ottoman camp before Caesarea, returned to Cairo with the venerable Chief Kadi of Brusa, named Shaikh 'Ali Calabi, as a peace messenger with plenipotentiary powers from Constantinople to negotiate a treaty. He had with him the keys of the citadels, which Kaitbey had demanded should be restored to him by Bayazid II as an essential preliminary of peace. The Sultan was simply overjoyed, but preferred to conceal his exultation. Almost immediately, however, he liberated all Ottoman prisoners of war, and did all that was possible to repatriate them in a suitable condition. The emir Djanbelat, who was destined to become Sultan in later years, left Cairo as a peace envoy to the Court of Bayazid. Calabi did not accompany him, for Kaitbey had graciously desired that the Kadi should remain in Egypt as a State guest until all Turkish prisoners were ready to return home. It was not till December 1492, therefore, that he left the Mamluk capital in the company of Mamay. Bayazid was now appeased, and all the more readily endorsed the terms of the treaty which his envoy had concluded, as he was at the moment turning his eyes towards the conquest of Belgrade<sup>(41)</sup>. Another Mamluk envoy, named Shaikh Abd-al-Mu'mim the Persian, left for Constantinople some time in 1494,



with an extraordinary present that consisted of "fine cloths, a lion, a giraffe, and one red parrot, besides others things". He did not return to Cairo until towards the close of the following year, as he had accompanied the Turkish ambassador to Naples, where Charles VIII, King of France, who had just conquered the town, announced to them the death of Prince Djem<sup>(42)</sup>.

Towards Kaitbey's son and successor, Muhammad, who became Sultan in 1496, Sultan Bayazid II showed a paternal affection worthy of his years; and although Muhammad's reign was short and turbulent, the young Sultan managed in 1497 to appoint the emir Khairbek to go to Constantinople to announce his accession, which had taken place in July of the preceding year. Khairbek, who became infamous in later years for the ignominious part he played in the downfall of the Mamluk empire, departed from Cairo in February 1498, but before he left Constantinople, the young Sultan Muhammad had been murdered in Cairo with the complicity of his uncle Kansuh, who succeeded him on the Mamluk throne<sup>(43)</sup>. Bayazid II, who was apparently informed in the presence of Khairbek of the treacherous assassination of the young Sultan, dismissed the envoy without ceremony, and he even threatened to wage war on the regicide uncle; but Kansuh sent another envoy to Constantinople, who succeeded in exonerating him in the eyes of the pious Ottoman<sup>(44)</sup>. This second envoy returned to Cairo in June 1501, to find that within the eighteen months of his absence Sultan Kansuh had been deposed, that Djanbelat and Tumanbey I. who succeeded him one after the other had been driven from the throne after a reign of a few months each, and that in April 1501, a fourth Sultan named Kansuh al-Ghuri had ascended the throne<sup>(45)</sup>.

Contrary to general custom, however, the new Sultan Kansuh al-Ghuri received no congratulatory embassy from the Court of Bayazid II., nor did he send a mission to Constantinople to announce his accession. That attitude of studied indifference was perhaps in part due to the flight of Dawlatbey, Governor of Syria and kinsman of the deposed Sultan Tumanbey I., to the Ottoman Court, Shortly after he had heard of the new accession<sup>(46)</sup>. Apparently Sultan Ghuri made no immediate approaches to Bayazid II on the subject of the truant emir; but in November 1502,

however, an Ottoman emissary reached Cairo to complain to the Sultan of the hardships that continually befell Turkish merchants in Egypt at the hands of Ali Ibn al-Djud, the Sultan's commercial agent, who had acquired such power and influence by concentrating in his person the inspectorships of the Pious Foundations, the Treasury, and the Viziership, as well as the offices of Privy Purse, Major-Domo, and Groom of the Bedchamber, besides other minor offices which went automatically with them. The Ottoman envoy was royally entertained by the Sultan and his emirs, and he succeeded in invoking Ghuri's displeasure on his all-powerful minister, who was summarily dismissed and shorn of all office and private gain<sup>(47)</sup> Dawlatbey, the rebel Governor of Syria, was presumably handed over as a matter of course to the Sultan, and from the time of the departure of the Ottoman from Cairo, in the company of a Mamluk envoy, in 1503, to the end of the reign of Bayazid II in 1512, embassies and counter-embassies of a friendly nature were exchanged between the Turkish and Mamluk Courts<sup>(48)</sup>.

With the new Turkish Sultan, Salim I., Kansuh al-Ghuri came into a fatal conflict in 1516. Salim, who had reached the ripe age of forty-seven when he was proclaimed Sultan, with the full support of the admiring Janissaries, proved to be a ruler and a general of indomitable will and vigour. He was the exact opposite of his father, Bayazid II, in his greed for the expansion of his empire; and no sooner had he finished with the task, then customary, of making himself secure on the throne by exterminating his two elder brothers, Korkud and Ahmad, their sons, and the rest of his nephews, than he turned his attention to war with Shah Ismail, the Safawi of Persia<sup>(49)</sup>. He met the brave Persian in August 1514, on the plain of Chaldiran, between Tabriz and Lake Urmiya, and destroyed his army. Peace was neither concluded nor contemplated, and in the following year Tabriz itself, which was Ismail's Capital, along with Mesopotamia and Western Armenia including Kharput, Maiyafarikin, Bitlis, Hisn Kaifa, Diyar Bakr, Urfa, Mardin, Djazira and the lands further south as far as Rakka and Mosul, were occupied by the Ottomans. Further frontier raids were continued on both sides for many years afterwards, but these annexations brought the Ottomans into close contact with the Mamluk boundaries in Syria and on the Euphrates. In the same year, 1515, Salim's forces made an end of the loyal vassal of the

Mamluks, 'Ala-al-Dawla of the Dhu-l-Kadr, having conquered all his lands, including the fortresses of Abulusteyn and Mar'ash<sup>(50)</sup>; and Sultan Kansuh al-Ghuri began to wonder whether his empire was going to be the next quest of the striding giant. Meanwhile Shah Ismail was seeking to attain the realization of his plans of revenge against Salim I., and decided to work for an alliance with European powers and the Mamluk empire<sup>(51)</sup>. About that time, too, apparently, a thirteen-years-old son of Salim's brother Ahmad, named Kasim, was smuggled to Aleppo, and allowed refuge by the Sultan in Cairo<sup>(52)</sup>. Both Turk and Mamluk had now a grievance against each other; the former had made light of Mamluk suzerainty over the Dhu-l-Kadr and annexed their country without much ado<sup>(53)</sup>, and the latter had, without doubt, shown his sympathies towards Shah Ismail, and had given harbour to a dangerous scion of the Sublime Porte<sup>(54)</sup>.

Whether or not it was at that time that the project of the conquest of Egypt was first entertained by Salim I. is not as important as the fact that during the opening months of 1516 there were land and sea preparations in Constantinople designed, it was said, for a new expedition against Persia. Sultan Kansuh al-Ghuri believed that these preparations were really meant for a double attack on Syria and Egypt, and that Salim I. had intended by spreading the rumour of a campaign against Persia to hoodwink him. The old Mamluk was perhaps not far wrong in his conjectures, for (he must have thus soliloquized) there was no conceivable need for a new fleet if Persia were the object of the impending expedition. In February 1516, therefore, Sultan Kansuh launched a vast programme of preparations; but had to put his house in order first, for his recently bought Mamluks (the *djilban* or *adjab*) had been for some time seething with discontent and clamouring for some of their usual money grants. Kansuh's had in despair forsaken the royal residence at the Citadel, and shut himself up at the Nilometer Palace for three days. His emirs intervened between him and his Mamluks, and he was induced to return to the Citadel, but as no redress was forthcoming the "recently bought ones", ignorant of the imminent danger to their very existence, began to threaten the Sultan with rebellion. Kansuh's anxiety regarding Ottoman preparations had no room for such



puerilities, and he summoned the chief officers of the barracks (aghawat al-tibak) to receive a sound piece of advice: "You must not make us the laughing-stock of the enemy," he said to them in reprimand, "and you should realise that Ibn 'Othman will soon be marching against us, and in the very near future an expedition must needs be despatched to check him.."<sup>(55)</sup>

Shortly afterwards, more definite news reached Cairo of the determined march of the Ottomans against the Sultan's territory, and in consequence al-Ghuri began to placate all ranks of Mamluks including the older corps (the karaniṣah) who had been abetting "the recently bought ones" against him<sup>(56)</sup>. All the able-bodied soldiers were called up to present themselves to the War Office, in order to receive the necessary payments to prepare themselves<sup>(57)</sup>. Iron arquebuses to the number of two hundred, besides several pounders and flint bombards, were sent to fortify Alexandria against possible invasion, and to give the Ottoman fleet a fitting reception should the city be its objective<sup>(58)</sup>. On 6 March, which coincided with the first day of the lunar month of Ṣafar, the Sultan instructed the Khalifa and four Chief Kadis, who had gone up to the audience for the monthly congratulations, to prepare themselves for the march with him to Aleppo<sup>(59)</sup>. He then began to review and enrol all available soldiery, so that none but the beardless youths were exempt from active service<sup>(60)</sup>. Meanwhile, the Sultan assembled his emirs of all ranks, and exempted none but a few aged men from service in the expedition<sup>(61)</sup>. The brother and sons of 'Ala-al-Dawla of the Dhu-l-Kadr, who had been since the death of the latter residing in Egypt under the Sultan's protection, left Cairo to raise their loyalist Turkoman auxiliaries, and join the Mamluk army on its arrival at Aleppo<sup>(62)</sup>. Previous to their departure, orders had also been issued to the bedouins of every province of Egypt and Syria to send a certain number of horsemen and foot soldiers<sup>(63)</sup>.

On 3 April, some pertinent news was received by Sultan Kanṣuh from the Governor of Aleppo, Khairbek, whose traitorous correspondence with Salim I. may be presumed to have begun a few months before that time<sup>(64)</sup>. Khairbek's despatch was to the effect that the Sultan was really misinformed as to

the destination of the preparing Turkish expedition, which (Kairbek had no doubt) was intended to attack Shah Ismail of Persia. As a proof of this deliberate invention, the despatch contained a lengthy exposition of the history of the war between Salim and Ismail, and a detailed account of the mustering forces of the latter in preparation for the forthcoming Turkish advance. Al-Ghuri was not convinced, however, and accordingly summoned a special council which decided, after a sitting that lasted the whole morning till noon, that an expedition must at any rate be sent as a precaution. It was deemed necessary also that the Sultan should accompany it himself, with the intention of remaining there to watch the results of the war, if any, between the Ottoman and the Persian, for it was believed that whichever of the two came off victorious would forthwith invade the Sultan's territories<sup>(65)</sup>. Khairbek had, however, impressed the Governor of Damascus, Sibey, with his argument about the impossibility of sinister intentions towards Egypt on the part of Salim. The credulous Governor, who was unjustly mistrusted by the Sultan, sent to Cairo a message informing Kanṣuh that there was no need for an expedition<sup>(66)</sup>. This made the Sultan more determined than ever, and by the middle of May 1516 all units were ready for the order of general march from Raidāniya outside Cairo<sup>(67)</sup>.

Meanwhile, the Sultan was making all final arrangements preparatory to his departure, but before he left the Citadel for the royal pavilion at Raidāniya, he received his long awaited table companion (nadīm) named Shankadji, whom he had commissioned earlier in the year to take to Aleppo a number of elephants for the purposes of the coming campaign, and had also entrusted with a message to Shah Ismail al-Safawi. But apart from the news that the elephants were safely driven to their place of destination, the chronicler failed to get any information as to the nature of the Sultan's "secret" message, or the Shah's reply. It is legitimate to presume, however, that in his communication, al-Ghuri promised Ismail his support, if the Turkish hordes were really to be directed against Persia; but it would be interesting to know to what undertaking the Shah pledged himself in the event of Salim I. pouncing instead, as he actually did, upon Mamluk territory<sup>(68)</sup>.

At Raidaniya, whither he had repaired for a few days as was customary before the general march, Sultan al-Ghuri received a second message from the Governor of Aleppo, Khairbek, with an enclosed letter from Salim I. The Governor's message informed the Sultan that a Turkish harbinger of peace was being entertained by him until the Sultan himself arrived in Aleppo for negotiations, and the contents of Salim's letter greatly pleased al-Ghuri and his emirs, and aroused in their minds a feeling that peace and an early return to their homes were at hand; but it is significant, however, that the Sultan did not cancel the march and return to Cairo. Salim's letter was expressed in pleasant terms to the following purport: After calling the Sultan his father, and offering prayer for his welfare, Salim I. asserted that he had not encroached upon the dominions of Ala-al-Dawla except with the Sultan's permission. It was Ala-al-Dawla, continued the Turkish letter, who had stirred up hostilities between Bayazid II and the Sultan Kaitbey, which had led to what had happened, and had caused the greatest mischief in the Sultan's country, so that his death was entirely justified. As to 'Alibek Dhu-l-Kadr, who had been installed in the place of 'Ala-al-Dawla, if the Sultan thought fit to retain him, or to replace him, the matter rested entirely in his hands. And as to slave merchants, Salim said he had not stood in their way but that they complained of their treatment as regards their payment in Egyptian money, and had refused to bring their purchases to Egypt. He further said that he was prepared to return to the Sultan the territories he had taken from 'Ala-al-Dawla, and would do whatever the Sultan desired. But as events showed later, all this was nothing but a piece of studied trickery, and consummate deception, on the part of Sultan I. and his servile accomplice, Khairbek<sup>(69)</sup>. A couple of days later, al-Ghuri marched towards Syria, after he had conferred a robe of honour on Tumanbey, his Dawatdar (Private Secretary), and appointed him regent in Cairo during his absence. At Ghaza, he received the first warning of the perfidy of Khairbek, but as his informer was unfortunately the suspected Sibey, the Sultan dismissed the accusation with a curt and indifferent reply<sup>(70)</sup>.

As soon as the Sultan reached Aleppo in July 1516, two Turkish envoys arrived from the camp of Salim I., who had



announce his presence in the Sultan's train<sup>(73)</sup>. This was as much as a challenge to Salim I.

Shortly afterwards the news reached Aleppo that Salim had refused the offers of peace mediation, had arrested the Sultan's emissary Moghulbey and put him in irons, and had marched southwards towards 'Aintāb. Kurtbey, the second envoy, knew of his forerunner's sad lot on his arrival at Aintāb itself, and returned post haste to Aleppo, and reported the capture of the fortress towns of Malatiya, Bahnasa and Karakar by the Ottomans, and the actual arrival of their advance-guard in the vicinity of, Aintab<sup>(74)</sup>. Al-Ghuri summoned the emirs, and once more made them swear to him that they would fight to the end. The emir Sibey, who had known all along of the treachery of Khairbek, could no longer contain himself; he flew at the latter and grasped him by the scruff of the neck : "O lord Sultan", he said, "if you wish, with the help of God, to obtain victory over your foe, then kill this perfidious traitor here and now !!" Another emir named Djanberdi al-Ghazali, Governor of Hamah, who was in complicity with the traitor, intervened and exhorted the Sultan not to ruin the morale of the army by listening to such calumny. Al-Ghuri needed no advice, for he had neither faith nor confidence in Sibey; and thus Khairbek was left to play his ignoble part<sup>(75)</sup>. The wonder was that the Sultan did not turn upon the distrusted Sibey and order his execution. Meanwhile Moghulbey arrived in a sorry plight, mounted on a wretched jade of a horse, and wearing a mouldy cap without a tassel with an ancient dirty corselet on his weary body. All he had for the Sultan was an oral message from Salim who had said to him with contumely : "Tell thy master that he can meet us on the field of Dabik". Al-Ghuri, who was reported to have disbelieved to the last minute that his envoy was really subjected to all kinds of insults and indignities by Salim I., now issued the general order for march "to meet the rebel Ibn Othman"<sup>(76)</sup>.

The first detachment to leave Aleppo was that of Turkoman auxiliaries under 'Abd-al-Razzak of the Dhu-l-Kadr, whom the Sultan now proclaimed lord of Abulusteyn and the country of the Dhu-l-Kadr. It was followed, on August 16th, by the Egyptian infantry, and the bulk of the Syrian units under their respective

emirs, including Sibey, Khairbek and Djanberdi; and three days later the Sultan himself marched with the corps of the Body-Guard. He joined the rest of the army at Djilan, and resumed the march from there to Dabik, a small village in the district of Azaz. At Dabik, the whole army halted till the 24th of the month, during which interval the Sultan inspected the troops in person, and gave final orders as to the command and the battle array<sup>(77)</sup>. On the fatal 24th at daybreak, Ottoman troops were sighted at a distance, but the Mamluks, it is to be observed, were not unprepared. Sultan al-Ghuri rode out at the head of his army to meet them; he was mounted on a charger, and wore a light turban and a mantle, with a battle-axe on his shoulder. On his right-hand side rode the Khalifah, also wearing a light turban and a mantle, and likewise carrying an axe on his shoulder, with the caliphal banner over his head. Around the Sultan, borne on the heads of a number of nobles, were forty copies of the Koran in yellow silk cases. There were also round him a body of dervishes of various sects, accompanied by their particular banners. Alongside of the Khalifah was the young Ottoman pretender, Kasimbsk. The royal red Standard was carried about twenty yards behind the Sultan, and under it marched the premier Mamluk, the four Kadis, and another leading emir. On the right flank of the troops was the misjudged emir Sibey, on the left flank the traitor Khairbek, and the centre was commanded by a trustworthy emir of Persian origin named Sudun<sup>(78)</sup>.

The battle began with a brave offensive against the advancing Ottomans by the centre and the right wing of the Mamluk army, under the emirs Sudun and Sibey, who fought desperately and inflicted terrible losses upon the Turkish ranks. Salim I. thought seriously of falling back, but at that moment a report reached the karanişah, who had hitherto borne the brunt of fierce Turkish artillery fire, that the Sultan had ordered his own corps "the bought ones", not to go into action at all. This was interpreted as a foul scheme on the part of the Sultan, to make an end of them as a condign punishment for all the trouble they had caused to him in former years. At any rate, the rumour was more than enough to damp their ardour. Meanwhile the emirs Sudun and Sibey fell, and a great number of the right

flank turned tail. This was followed by the desertion of Khairbek who, true to his secret promises to Salim I., made a semblance of resistance and then left the field with his troops, after spreading a rumour that the Sultan al-Ghuri was killed<sup>(79)</sup>.

Thus demoralised, the Mamluk army began to disperse pell-mell in all directions, under the heavy fire of Turkish artillery. In vain did the Sultan attempt to stem the ebbing tide, by calling out to his scattering troops to stand at bay and show their valour. But none listened to him, and he soon found himself in the midst of the slaughter, surrounded by a small number of soldiers of the Body-Guard. One of his emirs managed to find his way to where he stood, and fearing for the safety of the royal Standard, he lowered it, folded it up, and concealed it. Then he approached the Sultan and said to him : "Our King and Master, the troops of Ibn Othman are upon us, save thyself and go back to Aleppo". The sound of these words was too much for the old Sultan; he was seized with apoplexy, and asked for water, which was brought to him in a golden cup, and he drank a little. Then intending flight, he turned his horse round, moved on a few paces, but fell off his horse and died from the shock of his defeat. The news of this tragic end spread like wildfire in the Ottoman camp, and before the body of the dead Sultan was removed, Turkish soldiers advanced and made an end of the men who had remained round their master to the last. Then Salim I. advanced with his troops, and took possession of the Mamluk camp<sup>(80)</sup>.

There was nothing left for the fleeing Mamluks except to take refuge at Aleppo, but on trying to enter that town, they were attacked by the inhabitants who had suffered much injury, violence and dishonour at their hands during their stay there before their march to Dabik. Precipitately, the harassed soldiers quitted Aleppo and made for Damascus, which they reached in the sorriest plight, deprived of clothing and horses. They remained there for a few days until all survivors arrived, and marched thence to Cairo, which they entered in sad disorder in October 1516<sup>(81)</sup>. The news of the catastrophe of Dabik, however, had reached the Mamluk Capital on the 15th of the preceding month, since when Cairo and its people had been living in great



agitation and confusion, and wild talk had reigned everywhere, Tumanbey who had been acting as vicegerent during the Sultan's absence, went about Cairo issuing proclamations to restore public confidence and order, as if he were Sultan. His elevation to the throne, therefore, seemed to the people as something of a foregone conclusion, and when the matter was raised by the emirs returning from Dabik there was a unanimity of opinion that he should be selected Sultan. Tumanbey persisted in his refusal, but eventually consented, and was proclaimed Sultan on October 11, 1516<sup>(82)</sup>. On the following morning, the last batch of emirs arrived; they had remained behind at Damascus after the troops had left. Among these were the emir Djanberdi al-Gazali who, among others, was disappointed to find that Tumanbey had succeeded to the throne, and began to play the sequel to the part played by the arch-traitor Khairbek<sup>(83)</sup>.

By that time, however, the Turkish armies had advanced southward into Syria, making easy conquests of many towns<sup>(84)</sup>. Aleppo, to which Salim I. marched after Dabik, surrendered to him without opposition; and the Ottoman forces encamped there for eighteen days on the same square, called Kok Maïdan, which al-Ghuri had previously occupied<sup>(85)</sup>. Salim then resumed his march via Hamah and Hims to Damascus, which was surrendered on September 22<sup>nd</sup> by negotiation with the traitor Khairbek, who had publicly thrown in his lot with the Ottomans on their entry into Aleppo. Salim occupied Damascus and stayed there for about two months, during which time he ordered a mosque to be built on the tomb of Muhyi al-Din B. al-Arabi, the celebrated mystic<sup>(86)</sup>.

Dismal tidings of these easy victories, and the rumours of the plan of Turkish advance further southward, continued to pour into Cairo every day after the elevation of the new Sultan to the throne<sup>(87)</sup>. Tumanbey was alive to the seriousness of his situation; his plan was to march out at the head of his army, if necessary, and meet the Ottoman forces somewhere in Syria, before they were able to reach the Egyptian frontiers. But with Syria north of Damascus gone, the troops in disorder, and the emirs distracted and vacillating, he found himself faced by overwhelming odds. Thus it was not until December 3, 1516, and only because the

news that the Ottomans under the Grand Vizier, Sinan Pasha were on the point of taking Ghaza, that the army now raised in Cairo — delayed and diminished by the insatiable demands and waywardness of the soldiery — set out under Djanberdi, in the forlorn hope of saving Ghaza and guarding it until the Sultan came with the main forces. But before Djanberdi reached his destination Ghaza had already fallen, and the Mamluk army was beaten back after a short battle on December 19th by the forces of Sinan near the town of Baisan<sup>(88)</sup>. Sultan Tumanbey received the news of the fate of Ghaza three days after the departure of Djanberdi, and he now declared that he would go out in person to meet the invaders. For the sake of enlarging his forces, he gave orders that all desperadoes, roughs, thieves, and whosoever was in hiding on account of a murder or crime would receive pardon on presenting themselves for enrolment. On December 8th he began to review all expeditionary troops, and only exempted a small number of old soldiers. The same day the Sultan inspected a wooden vehicle drawn by oxen and carrying musketeers; there were about thirty or more of these vehicles. He also inspected camels carrying newly-invented shields to protect mounted sharpshooters. At the sight of those new war implements the troops felt in good heart for the coming fight<sup>(89)</sup>.

While these frantic preparations were going on in Cairo, Salim I, who had left Damascus and rejoined his forces at Ghaza, sent an envoy with peace offers to Tumanbey, on condition that the Sultan of Egypt recognised Ottoman suzerainty both in the coinage and public prayers (*al-sikka* and *al-khutba*): "If you wish to escape violent treatment, let an issue of *al-sikka* be struck in our name in Egypt", said Salim's despatch, "and let the *khutbah* be also delivered there in our name; and become our Governor from Ghaza to Egypt, while we rule from Syria to the Euphrates. But if you do not obey us, then I will enter Egypt, and kill all the Circassians . . . . . ." But thought the envoy and his followers were hooted and rough-handled in the streets of Cairo, Tumanbey showed that he was not disinclined to fall in with Salim's demand, in contradication to the empty boasting of some Mamluk emirs. Here it was either the Sultan's intention to temporise and gain time to perfect his preparations, or he was sick at the lack of spirit among his emirs, and wanted to infuse some zeal into

their hearts; for in face of his unceasing endeavours to make adequate preparations, it is difficult to picture Tumanbey as really in earnest in showing anxiety for peace. It was decidedly against his wish, however, that the Ottoman ambassadors were put to death<sup>(90)</sup>.

War preparations were immediately resumed, but strange to say, the Mamluk soldiery showed a singular lack of public spirit in those critical days, by haggling with the Sultan over the amount of the customary expedition largess,<sup>(91)</sup> and nothing could bring them to their senses short of the sorry spectacle of the crestfallen Mamluks from Ghaza, on their entry to Cairo on December 30th<sup>(92)</sup>. On the morrow, news arrived that the inhabitants of Ghaza, having on a false report of Egyptian victory attacked the Turkish garrison, were by Salim's order massacred in great number<sup>(93)</sup>. Twelve days later, terror and dismay pervaded Cairo when a courier arrived with the news that the Ottomans were now marching towards Egypt; Tumanbey marched out next morning to Raidaniya, with the intention of going on to the town of Salihya in the Sharkiya Province, where he would review all troops before they crossed the isthmus of Suez. But the plan of his emirs was to concentrate all forces at Raidaniya, and wait for the Ottoman there; and thus they prevailed upon the Sultan, and prevented him from leaving for Salihya. Tumanbey now set to work to fortify his position at Raidaniya; he ordered a trench to be dug along the front line, and then erected shielding works along that trench. The guns upon which he relied to silence the artillery of the Ottomans were drawn up and arranged round the shield works, and the newly invented wooden wagons, already mentioned, were arrayed in readiness for war. It was reported that the Sultan had assisted personally in the construction of these shielding walls, by carrying stones himself with the workmen<sup>(94)</sup>.

On January 16, 1517, news reached the camp at Raidaniya that Salim and his army had reached al-'Arish, the frontier town of Egypt. Tidings of further unopposed advance now followed closely on one another, with such rapidity that on the following 19th, the Inspector of the Sharkiya Province, whom the Sultan had despatched to obtain information regarding the Ottoman



forces, returned with the astounding report that he had seen on the outskirts of Salihya a numerous party of the Turkish advance-guard. Tumanbey again resolved to march out in person to Salihya where, with his fresh forces, he would have the chance of pouncing upon the Turks, wearied by the desert. Once more, however, he yielded to the persuasions of his emirs, who had now entrenched themselves firmly at Raidaniya. On the 22nd, the Turks were reported to have reached Birkat al-Hadjdj opposite Raidaniya, after having captured Bilbais and Khanka. The news spread like wild fire through the Mamluk camp, and in Cairo itself a state of great consternation ruled. As soon as the Sultan had confirmation of the reports he sounded the alarm, and a splendid army which numbered 20,000 men under thirty standards stood in readiness for battle. But no battle took place that day, as neither army ventured out to meet its adversary. Early next morning (January 23rd), the Ottoman forces were seen advancing on Raidaniya, and the Mamluks rode out to the outskirts of the town to meet them. Their units extended across the sandy plain, but the Ottomans came on "like locusts in multitude, and they were superior in point of numbers"<sup>(95)</sup>. A terrible battle ensued, in which both Salim I. and Tumanbey II took part in person, and the Mamluk Sultan slew the Grand Vizier, Sinan Pasha, believing he was Salim. The Mamluks were completely routed; and Tumanbey, who stood his ground to the last, finally took to flight. But the defeat was indeed inevitable, thanks to the emir Djanberdi who, acting in arrangement with the traitor Khairbek, had not only informed the enemy of the Mamluk plan of battle, but succeeded in convincing Sultan Tumanbey of the necessity of hiding most of the artillery till the very hour of need<sup>(96)</sup>.

Raidaniya definitely decided the fate of the Mamluk empire, and out of all the horrible story of pillage and plunder, massacre and blood, which ensued in Cairo on the entry of the victorious Turk, there is nothing worth recording except the heroic and pathetic struggle of Tumanbey II against inexorable fate. The fugitive Mamluk was verily destined to be the last Sultan of his race, and indeed he had no chance of seriously endangering the position of the Turk or loosening his throttling grasp on Egypt and Syria. Dabik and Baisan and Raidaniya had not only sapped the blood and energy of Mamluk power, but had brought the

Mamluk themselves into the cruel contempt of their Egyptian and Syrian subjects, especially the Bedouins who had no love for their extortionate masters<sup>(97)</sup>. Tumanbey himself, was not, however, without hope; he fought for his own to the very last, with a tenacity and daring worthy of Mediaeval romance.

After the battle of Raidaniya (23, January, 1517) Ottoman troops on the same day entered Cairo unopposed, and they carried fire and sword and violence into every street and suburb for three consecutive days<sup>(98)</sup>. But far above the din of plunder and hubbub, the name of Salim I. was being mentioned from the Cairo pulpits since the Friday service of January 23, 1517. One pious preacher ended his sermon (khutba) with a choice blessing which ran as follows: "And may God send victory to the Sultan, progeny of Sultans, King of the two lands and the two seas, Conqueror of the two armies, Lord of the two Iraks, servant of the two Holy Sanctuaries, the Victorious King Salim Shah". On the 25th, Salim moved his camp from Raidaniya to Bulak, which he preferred to the Citadel as headquarters for the time being; and on the following day he entered Cairo by Bab al-Nasr (Gate of Victory), in a splendid cavalcade. He went through the city preceded by a great procession which included the Khalifah, the four Chief Kadis, and a number of high Egyptian officials<sup>(99)</sup>. But Tumanbey II did not leave him in peace for long, for in the dead of the night, he attacked the Ottoman camp, and well-nigh re-gained the Capital. Tumanbey was, however, foiled in his attempt, and was driven out from the city on 31st January, after desperate and bloody street fighting which lasted for three days. It was followed by a general massacre<sup>(100)</sup>. Again Tumanbey managed to escape, and retired to Bahnasa in Upper Egypt; but he was now wearied with the continued struggle, and made advances for peace, offering to become tributary to the Porte and recognize Salim's suzerainty if the invaders would evacuate Egypt as far as Salihya. "If that would not suffice thee," said Tumanbey's despatch, "then march out and meet me on the bank of Djiza, where God will confer victory upon whom He pleaseth". Salim I., who had now strongly garrisoned the Citadel and taken up his residence there, was not averse from peace. He thereupon commissioned the Khalifa with the four Chief Kadis to accompany

a Turkish deputation, headed by one Muslik al-Din, for the purpose of arranging terms; but the Khalifah disliking the duty sent his private secretary instead. Unfortunately Tumanbey allowed himself to be overruled by his emirs, among whom his general Shadibek warned him against trusting Slaim. In consequence the delegates were not allowed to reach Tumanbey, but were waylaid by a party of Mamluk soldiers, who slew the Turkish members of the deputation and stripped the Kadis of all their belongings. Upon this Salim I. revenged himself by putting to death a number of prisoner emirs who had surrendered to him on his promise of sparing their lives; and he swore that he would march against Tumanbey and pursue him "to the end of the Earth"<sup>(101)</sup>.

Tumanbey did not wait for Salim to march southward, but advanced to Djiza as he had threatened to do in the event of failure to come to terms of peace. He reached Djiza with a considerable following, to find that Salim had encamped at Birkat al-Habash, on the opposite bank of the Nile. On being informed that the Ottomans were preparing to cross the river, the plan suggested itself to him that he should attack the ferry boats one by one as they reached the Djiza bank, and by so doing he did inflict severe losses on the Ottomans. Salim stopped the remaining boats, and a strange battle began between the two armies on opposite banks. Then Tumanbey was surprised from the rear by a swarm of Bedouins, who compelled him to retreat to the vicinity of the Pyramids<sup>(102)</sup>. Salim now crossed the river on an improvised bridge of boats, and met the Mamluk army near Wardan<sup>(103)</sup>. A fierce battle took place, but after two days' fighting, in which Tumanbey's general Shadibek nearly worsted the Ottomans and pushed them back towards the River, the remaining hopes of the last Mamluk Sultan vanished into thin air, on April 2, 1517<sup>(104)</sup>. For the third time Tumanbey managed to escape, and sought refuge with a Bedouin chief of Beheira Province in Lower Egypt, named Hasan ibn Mari, whom he had during the reign of Kansuh al Ghuri saved from imprisonment for life. But Hasan ungratefully betrayed him into Turkish hands, and seeing no way of escape Tumanbey surrendered himself to his pursuers. The news of his arrest impelled the remnants of his troops to abandon any hope of a further attempt against the Ottoman, and they dispersed in despair<sup>(105)</sup>. Tumanbey was eventually brought to Djiza in fetters, and was thus led to the presence of



Salim I. who upbraided him for his obstinate hostility and the murder of Turkish messengers. He maintained a noble front before his grim captor, and denied complicity in the murder; and he spoke out so fearlessly on the justice of his cause, and the duty to fight for the honour and independence of his people, that Salim was inclined to spare him<sup>(106)</sup>. The Ottoman seriously entertained the idea of either carrying him in his train to Constantinople, or sending him to Mecca, thus went the rumour in Cairo, to spend his remaining years in exile. But the traitors Khairbek and Djanberdi urged, for their own ends, that so long as Tumanbey was left alive, Ottoman rule in Egypt and Syria would be in danger<sup>(107)</sup>. Salim I. gave way to their argument, and after seventeen days of imprisonment Tumanbey was taken on April 13, 1517 to Bulak and paraded through Cairo to the Zawila Gate, where he was to be hanged. He had been told of his doom, on that very morning, outside Salim's pavilion by a Turkish herald; but he showed neither fear nor concern, and on his way to the scaffold he eyed the crowds with smiles and greetings. At the Zawila Gate where the crowd was thickest, he requested the spectators to recite the first Sura of the Koran thrice, for the salvation of his soul; and spreading out his two hands in supplication, he joined in the sad chorus. Then he turned to the hangman and said: "Do your duty". The noose was put round his neck, and the rope was pulled; but the rope snapped, twice it was said, and the body fell to the ground. Eventually the hangman did his duty, and the dead body that was once Sultan Tumanbey II remained suspended for three days, and then was buried at the Madrasa which Sultan Kansuh al-Ghuri had designed to be his own burial place<sup>(108)</sup>.

It was not till Tumanbey II had breathed his last, said Ibn Iyas the chronicler, that Salim I. became undisputed master of Egypt. That Egypt should have thus changed hands was regarded by him with resignation as the unalterable decree of Fate; but it puzzled him that it should at the same time sink into the position of a mere province of an empire, of which Cairo itself was not to be the Capital. "The incredible thing is," he wrote, "that Egypt became a governorship (niyaba), after its Sultan had been the greatest Sultan on Earth; for he was the servant of the two Holy Sanctuaries, and the holder of the kingdom of Egypt, of which .... Pharaoh himself was justly proud<sup>(109)</sup>.

## NOTES

1— The subject of this contribution to the Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts was the last chapter of my thesis, presented in October 1930, to the Department of Medieval History, University of Liverpool, for the Degree of Ph. D. At that time, the edition of the manuscript part of the Chronicle of Ibn Iyas had not been printed, and I was only able then to draw upon only the Paris portion of it, as indicated in the footnotes. Another source, however, namely the fragment of Ibn Tulun's Chronicle, edited in 1926 under the title *Das Tübinger Fragment der Chronik Des Ibn Tulun*, also reached me too late to utilise in my work. Yet this essay remains still the only modern treatment of the subject of the Ottoman Conquest of Egypt and Syria in any language at length, including Jansky's *Die Eroberung Syriens durch Sultan Salim I*, which deals only with the Syrian aspect of the campaign.

2— See *Ency. Isl.*, Art. *Shah Rūkh*.

3— Makrizi, *Suluk*, (B. M.), IV, fol. 93 A.

4— 'Aini, *Ikd.* (Paris MS.), fol. 176 B.

5— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, fols 180 A - B, 182 B., 183 B.; Abū-l-Mahāsin, *Nudjum* (Popper), VI, p. 632; Makrizi, *op. cit.*, IV, fol. 120 A.

6— Makrizi, *op. cit.*, IV, fols. 186 A., 188 B., 200 B.; Ibn Hadjar, *Durarr* (B. M.), fols. 306 B., 326 A.

7— Makrizi, *op. cit.*, IV, fol. 132 B.

8— Abū-l-Mahasin, *op. cit.*, VII, p. 253. It is difficult to allocate the date, but it is certain that Shahzadah was the third of the four ladies whom Djakmak married during his sultanate, and that the fourth one was Nafisa Dhū-l-Kadr. Shahzadah was, however, divorced in January 1451 (*Ibid. op. cit.* VII, p. 325), she was married with the Sultan's consent to a certain emir Barsbey al-Bidjasi, with whom she lived happily until her death in June 1454. (*Ibid. op. cit.* VII, pp. 585 - 586). Regarding Murad's filial feeling towards Djakmak, see Ibn Arabshah, *Adjaib* (B. M.), fol. 51. B.

9— Abū-l-Mahāsin, *op. cit.*, VII, p. 140; Ibn Hadjar, *op. cit.*, fols 367 A.; Sakhawi, *Tibr.*, pp. 89 - 100. It should be noted that Egyptian chroniclers, with the possible exception of Makrizi, were not always able to differentiate among the various Christian countries of central and eastern Europe, and thus called them *Bani al-Asfar* collectively. (See *Ency. Islam*, Art. *Asfar*). For the continued exchange of embassies between Djakmak and Murad, see Abu-l-Mahasin, *op. cit.*, VII, pp. 172, 186; Sakhawi, *op. cit.*, pp. 265, 306, 352.

10— For Abū-l-Mahasin's estimate of the rule of Murad II, see *op. cit.*, VII, pp. 357 - 358.

11— Sakhawi, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

12— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 348; Abū-l-Mahāsin, *op. cit.*, VII, p. 217.

13— Abū-l-Mahāsin, *op. cit.*, VII, pp. 436-438, 450; Ibn Iyas, *Badai* (Cairo), II, p. 44. For more details, see Abū-l-Mahāsin, *Hawadith al-Dūhūr*, (B. M.) fol. 106 A.

14— Abū-l-Mahāsin : *Hawadith* (B.M.) fols 142 B - 144 A. See also the Berlin copy of the same work, (Ahlwardt, No. 9462, WE, 1.), fols 53 B - 54 B. In his chronicle, Abū-l-Mahāsin (*op. cit.*, VII, p. 468) fell into the mistake of supposing that the letter contained news of the conquest of Constantinople.

15— Abū-l-Mahāsin : *Hawādith* (B. M.) fol. 145 B, 147 A - B; Ibn Iyas, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 55, 59.

16— *Ibid* : *Nudjum*, VII, pp. 737, 739-740, 741, 747-748, 751-752, 794-795, 805, 807; Ibn Iyas : *Op. Cit.* II, p. 81; see also *Ency. Isl. Arts.* Karaman-Oghlu & Dhu-l-Kadr.

17 - Muir : *Mamelukes*, p. 173; S.L. Poole : *Egypt in the Middle Ages*, p. 347. The only mention of Turco-Mamluk relations during the reign of Khūshkadam in the Arabic chronicles occurs in Ibn Iyās (*op. cit.*, II, p. 81), under the year A. H. 871 = Aug. 1466 - July 1467. It merely says "And in that year an envoy of Ibn Othman, King of Rūm, came to the noble audience, and was well received by the Sultan until he returned to his country".

18— Ibn Iyas, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 95, 100; Djawhari, *Anba* (B. N.) fol. 5 A. Most of the exiles returned to their country in 1467 and the following year, on hearing of the accession of Kaitbey (*ibid*).

19— *Ency. Isl.*, Art. Kaitbey. According to Djawhari (*op. cit.*, fol. 65 A.) Ahmad Karaman begged the Sultan not to leave him to the wrath of Muhammad II, but his envoy, who came to Cairo in March 1470, received nothing more from Kaitbey than empty expressions of sympathy.

20— Ibn Iyas, *op. cit.* II, 122; for details of Muhammad's Venetian conquests, see Eversley : *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 90.

21— Ibn Iyas *op., cit.*, II, pp. 144, 145.

22— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 145, 147, 151, 153, 172, 184. An estimate of the life of Muhammad II is to be found in the same work, II, pp. 204-205

23— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 206, 207, 209, 210-211. See also *Ency. Isl. Art.* Djem.

24— Ibn Iyas *op. cit.*, II, pp. 263, 278, 340. According to the same authority (p. 278 *supra*) Djem's son Ali died in Cairo, in September 1492. The



pretender's Serbian mother named Djudjuk, to whom he was deeply attached, died also in Cairo, in April 1498. (p. 340 *supra*).

25— *Ibid.*, *Op. cit.*, II, pp. 212, 214. See also *Ency. Islam*, Art. Djem.

26— *Ibid.*, *Op. cit.*, II, p. 227. See also *Muir, op. cit.*, p. 177.

27— *Ibid.*, *Op. cit.* pp. 219, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 232

28— *Ibn Iyas, op. cit.*, II, pp. 226, 227, 231.

29— *Ibid. op. cit.*, II, pp. 229, 230, 231, 234, 235, 239, 240. The original instructions to the emir Izbek were apparently to remain at the base of operations in case further hostilities broke out, but he was compelled to return on account of the spread of mutiny in the ranks of his troops.

30— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 237, 241, 245, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252.

31— " " " II, p. 242

32— " " " II, p. 252. See also *Ency. Islam*, Art. Djem.

33— " " " II, pp. 252 — 253, 254, 256 — 257

34— " " " II, p. 260.

35— " " " II, pp. 257, 260.

36— " " " II, p. 260.

37— *Muir, op. cit.*, p. 177, *Ency. Isl.*, Art. Djem. Innocent VIII obtained the possession of so valuable a prize as the heir to the Ottoman throne, for he was planning a Crusade against the Turks. But bribed by Bayazid, and failing in the hope of a religious war, the Pope kept Djem in durance in Rome, where he remained till 1494. He died at Naples in February of the following year, after taking part in the campaign of Charles VIII, King of France, against Naples. Pope Alexander VI (Rodrigo Borgia), who had come to the Apostolic Chair in 1495, was suspected of having poisoned him. (See *Ency. Isl.* and *Ibn Iyas, op. cit.*, II, p. 287.

38— *Ibn Iyas, op. cit.*, II, p. 262.

39— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 262 — 264, 265, 266 — 267.

40— " " " II, pp. 268 — 269, 270.

41— " " " II, pp. 270, 271, 280, 281. See also *Muir, op. cit.*, p. 178.

42— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, II, p. 292; *Pelicier; Letters de Charles VIII*, Vol. IV, pp. 181 — 182. Charles VIII had the body embalmed and sent to Gaëta, and it remained guarded by Djem's Turkish retinue; thence it was brought to Castello dell' Nove, where Charles met the Mamluk and Turkish ambassadors. It was not till four years later, and only after repeated requests on Bayazid II's part to have the body handed over to him, that Djem's remains were finally

sent by the King of Naples to the Sultan, who had them interred at Brusa.  
(see Ency. Isl. Art. Djem.)

43— Ibn Iyas, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 332, 339, 354.

44— " " " II, pp. 354, 362.

45— " " " (Paris MS.), fol. 120 B.

46— " " " " " fol. 119 B.

47— " " " " " fols 137 A., B., 138 A — B., 139 B.

48— " " " " " fols 142 A., 145 B., 166 A. It will be recalled that Dawlatbey rebelled again, and fled to Ala-al-Dawla of the Dhu-l-Kadr.

49— A young son of Ahmad named Kasim escaped the holocaust, and in later years reached the Court of Sultan al-Ghuri. See below.

50— Ibn Iyas, *Op. cit.* III. p. 5.; Ency. Isl. Art. Dhū-l-Kadr.

51— Le Strange: Don Juan of Persia, p. 121; see also the introduction to the same work, p.20. As for Shah Ismail's endeavours to ally himself with Europe against Salim, the attempt did not fructify until 1517. An offer of an alliance was actually made to him by the emperor Charles V, after Pope Leo X and Maximilian I. had previously thought of gaining Ismail as an ally against the Turks. But on account of the great distance which separated the Shah and the Emperor (it took almost six years for a letter to reach Charles V from Ismail), no definite arrangement was reached, and Ismail died in 1524. (See Ency. Isl. Art. Ismail).

52— Ibn Iyas, *op. cit.*, III, p. 32.

53— In a parody consisting of 117 Arabic lines (see Ibn Iyas, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 64-68), a certain popular poetaster of the period mentioned one economic reason, besides that of conquering the country of the Dhu-l-Kadr, as one of the grievances of Sultan al-Ghuri against Salim I. He said (lines, 3, 4, 5, 6) that great hardships were intensely felt in Egypt as a result of Salim I.'s embargo on the passage of products, fabrics and even slaves, from Asia Minor and elsewhere into Syria. "Wool ceased to be obtainable for the making of clothes; and many a year forsooth did we wait in vain for wool. For the whole parody see Salmons' translation of Ibn Iyas, pp. 64-70.

54— Salim I. had also some old grievances against the Mamluks. "Egyptian troops had on more than one occasion during his father's reign invaded Asia Minor, and celebrated their victories with long lines of captives led in triumph through Cairo.... See Arnold, : The Caliphate, p. 139.

55— Ibn Iyas, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 5-6.

56— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, III, p. 9.

57— " " " " p. 9.

58— " " " " p. 9.

59— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 10, 15, 16.

60— » » » » pp. 10, 13, 16.

61— » » » » pp. 15, 16.

62— » » » » pp. 9, 14.

63— » » » » pp. 6, 15. The foregoing is only a miniature picture of what was going on in Egypt on eve of the march. The account of Ibn Iyas (*op. cit.*, III, pp. 5-19) is so spirited, animated and detailed, that without any effort of imagination one can vividly picture the hurry and worry, bustle and painstaking, of Sultan al-Ghuri. "The stir that was pervading Cairo during that period was like that of the Day of Resurrection..., but the soldiery criticised the unnecessary hurry of the Sultan". (*Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, III, p. 19).

64— Ibn Zunbul: *Tarikh Akhdh Maṣr min al-Charakissa* (Leiden MS.), fols 4 A, 5 A.

65— Ibn Iyas, *op. cit.*, III, p. 15.

65— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 18 — 30; Ibn Zunbul, *op. cit.*, fol. 4 A — B.

67— » » » » p. 23. According to Le Strange, (*Don Juan of Persia*, p. 122), Shah Ismail was under some sort of pledge to come to the rescue of the Mamluks in the event of being attacked by the Turk.

68— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, III, p. 30. As for the alleged complicity of Sultan Ghuri in the fall of 'Ala-al-Dawla, see Ibn Zunbul *op. cit.* fols 3 A — B, 9 — 10 A.

69— Ibn Zunbul, *op. cit.*, fols 4 A — B., 5 — 6 A.

70— Ibn Iyas, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 30, 40, 41; Ibn Zunbul, *op. cit.*, fols 12 A — B.

71— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 41, 42, *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, fols 12 B — 13 B.

72— » » » » pp. 32, 42.

73— » » » » pp. 42 — 43; *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, fols 14 A—B, 15 A.

74— Ibn Zunbul, *op. cit.*, fol. 15 A—B.

75— Ibn Iyas, *op. cit.*, III, p. 45, Ibn Zunbul, *op. cit.*, fols 12 B—13 B., 14 A.

76— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 43, 45, *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, fol. 17 A.

77— » » » » pp. 45—46.

78— » » » » pp. 46, Ibn Zunbul, *op. cit.*, fols 17 A — 20 B. According to the latter authority the battle of Dabik took place on August 22nd. The Encyclopaedia of Islām gives preference to the 24th, which is given by Ibn Iyas. (see *Ency. Isl.*, Art. Selim I.)

79— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 47—48—57—58; *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, fols 21B—23B. According to Ibn Iyas, al-Ghuri's body "was not found amongst the dead, nor was it ever known what became of it". Ibn Zunbul (fol 22A) explained the



mystery away by saying that, before the Ottomans could reach the Mamluk camp, two good emirs cut off the head and managed to throw it into an adjacent well; thus the corpse was made unrecognisable, and the dead Sultan was spared the humiliation of having his head paraded on a pole in Constantinople.

80— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 49, 52, 56, *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, fols 25 A — 27 B.

81— " " " " pp. 53—71, *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, fols 30 A—B.

82— " " " " pp. 71—72, *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, fol. 30 B.

83— According to Ibn Zunbul, (*op. cit.*, fols 27B, 23A—33A) Sultan Salim I. was against the march to Egypt; but he gave in at last under stress of the persistent solicitations of Khairbek. Ibn Zunbul sought support for his argument in the fact that Salim did not penetrate into Persia, after Chaldiran in 1514; and he went on to say that the Ottoman had no desire to do more than Tamerlane had done in 1402, when the latter sacked Aleppo and Damascus and then retired. Generally speaking, it is not safe to make light of Ibn Zunbul's information, in view of the fact that he accompanied Salim I. during his whole campaign. A critical study of the morale of the Turkish army after Chaldiran readily shows that Salim returned to Constantinople only because of the rebellion of the Janissaries; and regarding his alleged desire to imitate Tamerlane the hypothesis was apparently a figment of the writer's imagination, as there was nothing admirable in the story of the sack of Damascus, and the memory of the insulting letter which the Mongol received from the Sultan of Egypt could not encourage Salim to ape the Mongol. Besides, it would be sufficient to recall to mind that Tamerlane was the captor of Salim's ancestor Bayazid I. in 1403; he was therefore the last person whom the imperious Ottoman would imitate.

84— Ibn Iyas, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 44, 50, 51. Had Shah Ismail of Persia marched upon the Ottoman camp at Aleppo, as he was alleged to have promised to do, Salim I would probably have been compelled to abandon the idea of carrying his conquests into Egypt. Ismail did not move a finger, however, for "noting that Sultan Selim had been so successful in overthrowing the Mamluks, and conquering the Egyptians, he abstained from interference, and left these, his allies, to their fate". *Le Strange Don Juan of Persia*, p.122.

85— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 78, 82., 235.

86— " " " " pp. 71, 74, 75, 77, 78. According to *Le Strange* (*Don Juan of Persia*, p. 122), Tumanbey "sent to Rhodes to beg a loan of artillery" The Knights refused to accede to the demand, and the rumour which reached the Sultan from Alexandria that Rhodian ships had come with

reinforcements for his assistance proved entirely false. (See Ibn Iyas : *op. cit.* III, p. 92).

87— Ibn Iyas, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 71, 77 — 78, 79. Djanberdi returned to Cairo on December 30th, and he attributed his defeat, not only to the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, but to the cowardice of his mercenary followers. From that time, however, his loyalty began to be suspected. (See *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 85 — 86).

88— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 80 — 81.

89— " " " " pp. 81 - 83, 88, Ibn Zunbul, *op. cit.* fols 33B-35A

90— " " " " pp. 84—85.

91— " " " " pp. 87—88.

92— " " " " p. 88.

93— " " " " pp. 90, 91, 93 — 93. It appears that many years before 1516, a moor of North Africa had come to Sultan Kanṣuh al-Ghūri with the newly invented fire-arm (Ar. bundūkiya = Gun or musket). The moor said that the weapon had just appeared in Asia Minor (Turkey) and the West, and advised the Sultan to train a special Mamlūk corps in the use of it. The Sultan caused a few soldiers to be brought to his presence, and had the new arm demonstrated before them. But when the soldiers tried a few shots, the Sultan was unimpressed, and even displeased with the "unworkableness" of the weapon; he turned to the moor and said : "We shall not abandon the teachings of our Prophet . . . for [the sake of] adopting the [new] methods of the Christians". (Ibn Zunbul : *op. cit.* fol 49 A — B). It was this new weapon, together with the heavy Turkish artillery, that frustrated all Mamlūks attempts to check the hordes of Salim I, but the Mamlūks knew it too late. (*Ibid.* *op. cit.* fol 48 A; also see below). As for the types of field artillery, which occur in the Arabic chronicles of the period, these are the Mikla' (arquebus), the madfa' (bombard), and manganik (catapult).

94— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 93—95.

95— *Ip., cit.* III, pp. 96—97; Ibn Zunbul, *op. cit.*, fols 39A—44B. The story of Djanberdi's treachery is told in minute detail by Ibn Zunbul; Ibn Iyas who did not seem to have been aware of it yet, corroborated the truth of it, in an unintentional way. Thus he wrote: (*op. cit.*, III, p, 97) "The Turkish force that had advanced under cover of Djabal al-Ahmar (Red Mountain), now came down upon the tents of the Sultan (Tumanbey), plundering everything, kit, arms, horses, camels and oxen, including the guns the Sultan had put into position there, with the shields and palisading, and the vehicles on which the Sultan had spent so much time, labour and money, and from which he had reaped no advantage. Everything in the camp was plundered.

Such was the decree of fate". On page 107 (*ibid*). Ibn Iyas went on to say that Djanberdi had been secretly plotting with Salim I, since the days of Sultan al-Ghuri, and that the catastrophe of the field of Dabik was as much due to his treachery as to that of Khairbek.

96— Ibn Iyas, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 88, 90. According to the same authority (*op. cit.*, III, p. 97), "rascals and slaves set to work to rob the houses under the mask of Turks"; many of the houses belonging to leading Mamluk officials were plundered. As for the attitude of the Bedouins towards their vanquished oppressors, several references in Ibn Iyas and Ibn Zunbul could be cited to show how the Bedouins hindered the military operations of the Mamluks against the Ottomans. (See for instance Ibn Zunbul, *op. cit.*, fols 67A—B, 102B—105A.) Other tribes, however, remained loyal to the Mamluk cause. (See Ibn Iyas, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 109—110).

97— The story of those three days is graphically told by Ibn Iyas, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 97—98, 99—100.

98— Ibn Iyas, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 98, 99—100.

99— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 102—105.

100— » » » » pp. 106—110, 111, 113; Ibn Zunbul, *op. cit.*, I, fols 62 B—64 B, 65 B.

101— Ibn Zunbul, *op. cit.*, fols 64B, 66B—67A.

102— Ibn Iyas (*op. cit.*, III, p. 112) could not give the exact locality where the battle was fought: "The armies of Ibn Othman and those of Sultan Tumanbey met at Wardan; but some said that the encounter took place at al-Manawāt . . ., others said that the battle was fought at Kum al-Homār". According to Ibn Zunbul (*op. cit.*, fols 60 A, 73 B), Tumanbey retreated to Dahshūr, after appointing Shadibek to the command and instructing him to engage Salim on the first chance of an encounter.

103— Ibn Iyas, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 112—113, Ibn Zunbul fols 89 A—90 A, 91 B—102 A. The latter authority deals with the vicissitudes of the battle in great detail.

104— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, III, p. 114, *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, fols 121 A—132 B.

105— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, III, p. 114. Ibn Zunbul gave a much more detailed narrative of the meeting between the Ottoman and the Mamluk. (see *op. cit.*, fols 134B—138B).

• 106— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 115, 316; *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, fols 138B.

107— *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 115, 125; *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, fols 124—144B.

According to the former authority Tumanbey knew nothing of his doom until he was dismounted at the Zawila Gate.

• 108— Ibn Iyas: *op. cit.*, III, pp. 116, 133.

M. Mustafa Ziada

معين التاريخ  
لأهل التاريخ